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 The issue of when life begins has inspired heated debate in this country for nearly 
half of a century. The importance of this issue cannot be overstated; it has played a 
pivotal role in elections of public officials and in confirmation hearings of federal judges 
and justices and has dominated legal, political, economic, religious and ethical 
discussions. While the issue is far from resolved, it will be joined by another contentious 
issue in the near future. With our society rapidly getting older, and with the rapidly rising 
cost of health care, including the extremely high cost of end-of-life care, Americans will 
soon be confronted with the difficult question of when to die. In fact, the issue of when 
life ends has the potential to be even more controversial than the abortion issue. Some 
terminally-ill patients feel that the option of physician assisted suicide (PAS) should be 
available to them. Two states, Oregon and Washington, have legislation allowing 
terminally-ill, mentally competent adults to request the medical means to end their lives. 
Rhode Island currently has legislation making it illegal for anyone to assist another 
person in the act of committing suicide.  
This paper will thoroughly examine all sides of the issue from a variety of 
disciplines. Relying on both extensive research and several interviews with members of 
the academic and legal communities, this paper will closely look at PAS in both theory 
and practice. The implementation of the Oregon and Washington laws will be discussed 
in detail. It will also discuss the potential implications of physician assisted suicide 
  
legislation on both a national and a state level in an effort to determine the appropriate 
response to end of life concerns in the state of Rhode Island. 
Introduction 
The question of when life begins continues to haunt my parents’ generation. 
While many years have passed since abortion was recognized as a fundamental 
constitutional right in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of Roe v. Wade in 1973, 
there is still no widespread consensus on it in this country. Abortion clinics have been 
subjected to a considerable amount of violence in the last thirty years. From 1977 to 
1994, over 1,700 documented acts of violence against abortion providers have occurred.1 
In 1984 eighteen abortion clinics were bombed in the United States and in the year 1994 
alone, four people were killed as a result of abortion clinic violence. Furthermore, in 
1996 nearly a third of all abortion clinics in the U.S. reported being effected by 
bombings, threats, and harassment.2 To this day, the issue of abortion plays a critical role 
in the appointment of federal judges. Where a particular candidate stands on the issue 
could make the difference between confirmation and rejection. In the 2005 confirmation 
hearings for the current Chief Justice John Roberts, several federal legislators indicated 
that their votes for either confirming or rejecting his appointment would hinge on which 
side of the abortion spectrum he fell on.3 The issue is far from being resolved and it 
                                                 
1
  “Abortion Clinic Violence,” MSNBC, 1997, <http://msnbc.com/modules/clinics/>. Hereafter cited 
as MSNBC Violence. 
2
  MSNBC Violence. 
3
  Senator John Cornyn, “An Abortion Litmus Test for Judge John Roberts,” The San Diego Union 
Tribune, 7 August 2005, <http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20050807/news_mz1e7cornyn.html>. 
  
certainly illustrates the delicate nature of the conflict between personal choice and 
societal values. 
 Much like the question of when life begins that has dogged preceding generations, 
the question of when life ends will, I believe, dominate the legal, political, economic, 
religious, and ethical discussions of future generations. It will become a contentious, 
important public policy debate for two reasons. First, the high cost of health care, and its 
rapid rise, in America will put increasing pressure on governments, businesses and 
individuals. Second, substantial increases in life expectancy due to rapidly improving 
medical technology will create increasing numbers of individuals who will seek to end 
their lives because of a lack of “quality.” Add in the fact that our society is getting older 
very quickly and it becomes apparent that, in a short period of time, this issue will erupt 
onto the national agenda and is likely to be more toxic than the abortion issue. This is 
especially problematic in the U.S., a society that values the freedom of personal choice. 
Some patients want to be given a wide array of medical choices when deciding what 
treatment option is best, while some patients with terminal illnesses for whom the quality 
of life is far below their personal standards will argue for the right to end their lives. In 
my opinion, it is time to make a step in the direction of providing people with that choice. 
I am proposing that the practice of physician assisted suicide (PAS) be legalized in Rhode 
Island and in this paper I intend to make that case. This paper will look at the problems 
created by the size and rise of the cost of health care administration in the U.S. as well 
PAS in practice and the issues that the physician assisted suicide debate brings up. PAS 
usually entails a physician providing a terminally ill, mentally competent patient with the 
  
medical means to end one’s life at the patient’s repeated request, followed by the act of 
ingestion of the medication by the patient. While debate around this practice is relatively 
new, the time for Americans to discuss the issue will soon be upon us. 
 
 
Demographics and Health Care Costs 
The cost of health care in America is out of control. Americans spend far more o 
health care than any other industrialized society and health care costs are rising at 
unsustainable rates. Additionally, the life expectancy of Americans is among the lowest 
of the world’s 30 wealthiest countries. According to OECD data, life expectancy at birth 
was 77.8 years in 2005, which placed it 24th on the list of 30 countries – just below 
Portugal and above the Czech Republic, Mexico and Poland.4 Life expectancy is, 
however, rising in the United States. Life expectancy at birth in the U.S. in 2005 was 
nearly 10 years longer than it was in 1960, nearly fourteen years longer than it was in 
1940, and thirty years longer than it was in 1900.5 This is shown graphically below: 
                                                 
4
  “OECD Factbook 2009,” Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
<http://oberon 
 .sourceoecd.org/vl=581474/cl=18/nw=1/rpsv/factbook2009/11/01/01/index.htm>. 
5
  Elizabeth Arias, “U.S. Life Tables, 2004,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 28 Dec 
2007, < http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_09.pdf>.   
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On the issue of health care cost, much is often made about the amount spent on 
national defense but according to the National Coalition on Health Care, health care 
spending in the USA is over four times as large as defense spending.7 Even though 
almost 46 million Americans are uninsured, the United States pays six times more per 
capita on the administration of health care than the average Western European country 
does in the administration of a universal system of health care.8 In 2008, health care 
spending in the United States reached $2.4 trillion, which represents 17% of this 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP). This share of GDP is projected to jump to 20% 
within eight years.9 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 5.7% of all consumer 
                                                 
6
  This graph created in Microsoft Excel using data from the footnote above. 
7
  “Health Insurance Costs,” National Coalition on Health Care, 2009, <http://www.nchc.org/facts/ 
cost.shtml>. Hereafter cited as NCHC. 
8
  NCHC. 
9
  NCHC. 
  
expenditure is on health care. This share increases to 12.7% for those consumers who are 
65 years of age and older.10 In addition, while the overall Consumer Price Index (CPI) for 
all items declined by 0.4% from March 2008 to March 2009, the CPI for medical care 
increased by 2.8% over the same period. This increase was fueled by a 6.1% increase in 
the CPI for hospital and related services.11 Furthermore, the graph below shows that the 
growth in medical costs has far outpaced the growth in earnings, especially in the years 
following 1980: 
 
Of the large amount spent on health care, a substantial amount is spent on end-of-life 
care. At the close of the millennium, it was estimated that end-of-life care accounts from 
anywhere from 10-12% of all health care expenditure.12 Annual expenditure for hospice 
                                                 
10
  “Table  47. Age of Reference Person: Shares of average annual expenditures and sources of 
income,” Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2007, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Hereafter cited as Table 47.  
11
  “Table 1. Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U): U.S. city average, by 
expenditure category and commodity and service group,” Bureau of Labor Statistics, March 2009. 
12
  Carol Raphael et al., “Financing End-of-life Care in the USA,” Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine 94 (January 2001): 458-461. 
  
care was $3.5 billion while the expenditure for home care was $29 billion.13 A quarter of 
the Medicare budget is estimated to be spent on a beneficiary in the last year of life and 
40% of that amount is spent on a person’s last 30 days.14 
 In addition to the extremely high cost of health care and end-of-life care, 
American society is aging rapidly. In the near future, with the retirement of the baby 
boomer generation, immense pressure will be felt by society to try to care for the growing 
number of elderly citizens. In the coming years, the number of elderly citizens is 
projected to grow much faster than the number of working age citizens, as evident in the 
chart below:  
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One can see from this graph that the elderly population is projected to experience 
to increase rapidly in the fiver year spans from 2010-15 to 2025-2030. While the elderly 
                                                 
13
  Raphael et al., 458-461. 
14
  Raphael et al., 458-461. 
15
  This graph was created in Microsoft Excel relying on “Table 2. Projections of the Population by 
Selected Age Groups and Sex for the United States: 2010 to 2050,” National Population Projections, 2008, 
U.S. Census Bureau. 
  
population will experience double-digit increase in these time periods, the working age 
population will experience far more modest growth, at only 2-3% per five year span. The 
alarming percentage increase in the number of elderly citizens certainly dwarfs the 
corresponding percentage increase in the number of working age citizens. It is further 
projected that the total U.S. population will grow by 29.2% from the year 2000 to the 
year 2030. In this same time period, it is projected that the population of those aged 65 
and older will grow by 104.2%!16 What impact will this have on society? Below is a 
graph depicting the number of working aged citizens for every elderly citizen based on 
the U.S. Census Bureau’s national population projections: 
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  “Table 4: Interim Projections: Change in Total Population and Population 65 and Older, by State: 
2000 to 2030,” State Interim Population Projections by Age and Sex: 2004-2030, U.S. Census Bureau. 
Hereafter cited as Table 4, U.S. Census Bureau. 
17
  This graph was created in Microsoft Excel relying on the table cited above in Footnote 12. 
  
 As one can see from the graph, the number of workers supporting the elderly is 
projected to decline sharply in the next 30 years. Today there are nearly five working 
aged citizens who, at least in theory, can be working to provide the funds to support one 
elderly citizen, but this is projected to decline sharply in the coming years as the baby 
boomers begin to retire. By 2030, that proportion is expected to fall to nearly three. If 
society has difficulties dealing with the high cost of health care and end-of-life care now, 
imagine how great those difficulties will be thirty years from now when the amount of 
workers supporting the elderly is almost cut in half! 
 The situation in Rhode Island looks even worse. While the total Rhode Island 
population is projected to increase by 10% from 2000 to 2030, the population of those 
aged 65 and older is projected to increase by 61.7%.18 How about the number of workers 
supporting each elderly RI citizen? That ratio is depicted graphically below: 
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  Table 4, U.S. Census Bureau. 
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 The graph above makes it clear that Rhode Island is projected to suffer a similar 
fate as the United States in the years ahead. With just fewer than four and a half working 
aged citizens for every elderly citizen, RI can expect to see this ratio decrease 
significantly to just over three working aged citizens for every elderly citizen. While the 
projected drop-off in RI is not as pronounced as the projected national drop-off, it seems 
clear that, with an extremely high cost of health care and a rapidly aging society, America 
will be forced to address some tough questions in the years ahead. One step in answering 
these tough questions is the legalization of physician assisted suicide. 
History of Physician Assisted Suicide (PAS) 
 The PAS legislation being proposed for RI is based on the experiences others 
have had with the issue. In this paper I will discuss five important examples of the 
practice of physician assisted suicide; physician assisted suicide in the Netherlands, the 
                                                 
19
  This graph was created in Microsoft Excel relying on, “Projections of the Populations, by Age 
and Sex, of States: 1995 to 2005,” State Population Projections, 1996, U.S. Census Bureau. 
  
exploits of Dr. Kevorkian, physician assisted suicide in Oregon and Washington, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s rulings on physician assisted suicide legislation, and Rhode Island’s 
stance on physician assisted suicide. 
 
PAS in the Netherlands 
 Officially, physician assisted suicide and euthanasia became legal in the 
Netherlands in April of 2002.20 However, the practice of both physician assisted suicide 
and euthanasia has been condoned by the courts of the Netherlands since 1981.21 In the 
Oregon and Washington laws, an important distinction exists between physician assisted 
suicide and euthanasia. Physician assisted suicide involves a physician writing a 
prescription for medication that will end life and the patient’s act of ingesting that 
medication. Euthanasia, on the other hand, involves a physician actively killing a 
suffering patient in a painless way, usually through lethal injection.22 As will be 
discussed shortly, a big distinction is drawn in both the Washington and Oregon laws 
between physician assisted suicide and euthanasia. This distinction is not an important 
one in the Netherlands and both physician assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia 
(euthanasia at the patient’s request) are legal there.23 In 1981, the Rotterdam Court of the 
Netherlands set forth the guidelines for physicians in assisting terminally ill patients in 
ending their lives. These guidelines include the following requirements: the patient must 
                                                 
20
  Derek Humphry, “Tread Carefully When You Help to Die: Assisted Suicide Laws Around the 
World,” Euthanasia Research and Guidance Organization, 1 March 2005, 
<http://www.assistedsuicide.org/ suicide_laws.html>.  
21
  “Euthanasia in the Netherlands,” International Task Force, no date of publication given, 
<http://www. internationaltaskforce.org/fctholl.htm>. Hereafter cited as International Task Force.  
22
  Oxford American Dictionary, 2006, s.v. “euthanasia.” 
23
  Humphry. 
  
be experiencing unbearable pain and be conscious, the death request must be voluntary, 
the patient must be informed of alternatives to death and must be given time to consider 
these alternatives, there must be no other reasonable solutions than ending the patient’s 
life, the patient’s death must not inflict unreasonable suffering on others, more than one 
person must be involved in the decision to end the patient’s life, only a doctor can 
euthanize the patient, and great care must be taken in making the death decision.24 In 
addition to these requirements, physicians were expected to report each assisted 
suicide/euthanasia death to the local prosecutor.25 The guidelines set forth by the 
Rotterdam Court in 1981 are similar to those guidelines set up by physician assisted 
suicide legislation in the United States. For this reason, many opponents of physician 
assisted suicide fear that any legalization of the practice will suffer the same fate as the 
Netherlands practice has suffered. 
 Physician assisted suicide and euthanasia in the Netherlands proved difficult to 
contain, even with the requirements set up by the Rotterdam Court. Small expansions of 
the practice seemed logical at the time. In 1986, for example, The Hague Court of 
Appeals ruled that the unbearable pain requirement was not limited to physical pain. The 
court recognized that “physic suffering” or “the potential disfigurement of personality” 
could also be grounds for granting a request for physician assisted suicide or euthanasia.26 
Also in 1986, a Dutch court found that a physician acted within the law when he gave a 
lethal injection to a young quadriplegic woman because “paralyzed patients have 
                                                 
24
  International Task Force. 
25
  International Task Force. 
26
  International Task Force. 
  
difficulty swallowing and could die from aspirating their food at any time.”27 Similarly, a 
court decision made in 1993 in the Netherlands upheld the legality of a physician’s 
assistance in ending the life of a physically healthy fifty year old woman who wanted to 
die because of the death of her two children and the breakup of her marriage.28  
 In addition to the expansion problems, the Netherlands practice of physician 
assisted suicide and euthanasia demonstrated widespread abuse. In September of 1991, 
the first official government report of the practice was issued. Popularly called the 
Remmelink Report, the report chronicled the practice in the year of 1990.29 The results 
were very disturbing. The report found that an extremely large number of patients were 
euthanized without their consent. In 1990 alone, 1,040 patients, almost three per day, 
were euthanized without their express consent. Of these cases, 72% never gave any 
indication that they wished to end their lives and, in 8% of the cases, the doctors admitted 
that there were other alternatives available but that they thought that euthanasia was the 
best course.30 The most frequently cited reasons given by doctors who put patients to 
death without their consent were “low quality of life,” “no prospect for improvement,” 
and “family couldn’t take it anymore.”31 Additionally, 4, 941 patients were given 
intentional overdoses of pain medication without their knowledge or consent in 1990. 
                                                 
27
  Richard Doerflinger, “Assisted Suicide: Pro-Choice or Anti-Life?,” in The Right Thing to Do: 
Basic Readings in Moral Philosophy, 5th ed., ed. James Rachels and Stuart Rachels (Boston: McGraw Hill, 
2007), 317. 
28
  International Task Force. 
29
  International Task Force. 
30
  International Task Force. 
31
  International Task Force. 
  
This led the report to conclude that the majority of euthanasia deaths in the Netherlands 
are involuntary.32 
 The practice of physician assisted suicide and euthanasia in the Netherlands also 
has expanded to disabled newborn children. The Remmelink Report made no mention of 
the euthanasia of disabled newborn children but several documented cases existed.33 In 
1992, a year after the report was issued; the Dutch Pediatric Association issued formal 
guidelines for the euthanasia of severely handicapped children. The rationale behind this 
was explained by the chairman of the associations Working Group on Neonatal Ethics 
when he said, “Both for the parents and the children, an early death is better than life.”34 
Understandably, many critics of physician assisted suicide view the events that have 
transpired in the Netherlands with horror. Seemingly small expansions that seemed 
rational at the time have provided the basis for further expansions. The end result is a 
system that seems to be far from the one set up by the Rotterdam Court in 1981. Many 
opponents of physician assisted suicide legislation feel that any legislation enacted in the 
United States will follow the path of physician assisted suicide in the Netherlands. 
 
Dr. Kevorkian 
 In physician assisted suicide literature, few names are mentioned more than Dr. 
Jack Kevorkian. Dr. Kevorkian was a media magnet in Michigan in the 1990s and he 
certainly generated a substantial amount of attention for the physician assisted suicide 
                                                 
32
  International Task Force. 
33
  International Task Force. 
34
  International Task Force. 
  
cause. Both proponents and opponents of the practice were critical of the pathologist’s 
practices, however.  
 In 1956, Kevorkian published a journal article discussing his efforts to photograph 
the eyes of dying patients. That publication earned him the nickname “Dr. Death.”35 The 
nickname seems appropriate for Kevorkian, as he would dedicate his career to the study 
of death and to helping dying patients end their lives. Kevorkian advertised in several 
Detroit area newspapers as a “physician consultant for death counseling” in 1987 and, a 
year later, he published an article outlining a proposal for suicide clinics that would 
provide planned death services.36 The following year Kevorkian crossed the line between 
theory and practice when, using thirty dollars worth of spare parts, he built his so-called 
“suicide machine.”37 He called this machine the “Thanatron,” which is Greek for “death 
machine.” This machine was designed for the patients to use themselves; by pushing a 
button, the IV saline solution, that the patient would already be hooked up on, would stop 
and a drug of thiopental would be released on a sixty second timer. The patient would go 
into a deep sleep and, at the timer’s click, a lethal dose of potassium chloride would be 
released that would stop the heart in minutes. The patient would essentially die of a heart 
attack in their sleep.38 
 On June 4, 1990, Janet Adkins became the first of Kevorkian’s patients to use the 
Thanatron to end her life. This was done in the back of Kevorkian’s 1968 VW van while 
                                                 
35
  “Chronology of Dr. Jack Kevorkian’s Life and the Assisted Suicide Campaign,” Frontline: The 
Kevorkian Verdict, PBS, < http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/kevorkian/chronology.html>. 
Hereafter cited as PBS. 
36
  PBS. 
37
  PBS. 
38
  “The Thanatron,” Frontline: The Kevorkian Verdict, PBS, < 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ kevorkian/aboutk/thanatronblurb.html>.  
  
it was parked in a public park.39 He continued to allow his patients who wished to end 
their lives to use the Thanatron until, in November of 1991, his license to practice 
medicine in Michigan was revoked by the state medical board. With no license to 
practice medicine, Kevorkian could no longer obtain the potassium chloride needed for 
his Thanatron.40 Kevorkian resorted to much cruder means of helping patients end their 
lives; he used a tank of carbon monoxide hooked up to a facemask. The tank was turned 
on and a clip was placed on the air hose going from the tank to the facemask. In order for 
some one in this situation to end their life they needed to simply remove the clip from the 
hose to allow the carbon monoxide to flow freely.41 Kevorkian continued this practice 
throughout the 1990s. Despite several criminal actions brought against Kevorkian, 
Michigan had no law on the books expressly outlawing physician assisted suicide. In 
1993, the governor of Michigan signed legislation banning physician assisted suicide but 
it was held up for many years in the court system.42 All of the actions against Kevorkian 
during this time were unsuccessful.  
 In 1998 Kevorkian allowed the CBS program “60 Minutes” to do a segment on 
him. The segment showed Kevorkian administering a lethal injection to Thomas Youk, 
who was suffering from ALS.43 This act was different from all of Kevorkian’s previous 
assisted suicides. By administering the lethal injection to Youk, Kevorkian was not 
merely assisting in Youk’s suicide; he was actively killing Youk at Youk’s request. In 
                                                 
39
  PBS. 
40
  PBS. 
41
  PBS. 
42
  PBS. 
43
  “Kevorkian Released From Prison After 8 Years,” MSNBC, 1 Feb. 2009, < 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ id/18974940/>. Hereafter cited as MSNBC.  
  
Michigan, this act constituted murder and, in 1999, Kevorkian was tried and found guilty. 
He was sentenced to 10-25 years, but was released in 2007 for good behavior. The 
conditions of his parole are that he is not to help in another suicide, care for anyone over 
the age of 62 or for anyone who is disabled, or to show anyone how to build his suicide 
machine.44  
 Proponents of physician assisted suicide have mixed feelings about what 
Kevorkian did. While they admire him for his courage, determination and compassion, 
they are critical of his methods.45 A significant number of Kevorkian’s patients were not 
Michigan residents. As a result, many had to end their lives in public cabins, at the home 
of Kevorkian’s assistants or even in the back of Kevorkian’s van.46 Additionally, 
Kevorkian made little effort to examine the patients’ causes of suffering. Contrary to the 
systems of Oregon and Washington, discussed below, that provide for an examination of 
the patient to see if they are of sound mind and not depressed, Kevorkian made no effort 
to screen out depressed patients. Marjorie Wantz, for example, came to Kevorkian with 
severe pelvic pain. After she ended her life using the Thanatron, her autopsy revealed that 
she had no physical cause for her pain. Furthermore, her medical record showed that she 
had been hospitalized for mental problems.47 Another of Kevorkian’s patients, Rebecca 
Badger, claimed to have multiple sclerosis. After her suicide, her autopsy revealed that 
she had no disease and it was later reported that she suffered depression and was addicted 
                                                 
44
  MSNBC. 
45
  Donald Humphry, “Evaluating Dr. Kevorkian’s Contribution to the Right-to-Die Movement in 
America,” 1 June 2007, Euthanasia Research & Guidance Organization, < 
http://www.assistedsuicide.org/Kevorkian 
_contribution_to_the_right_to_die_movement_in_America.html>.  
46
  PBS. 
47
  Wesley J. Smith, “Death on Demand: The Assisted-Suicide Movement Sheds Its Fig Leaf,” The 
Daily Standard, 5 July 2007, < http://www.discovery.org/a/4121>. 
  
to pain killers.48 Kevorkian claims to have helped over 130 of his patients end their 
lives.49 How many more of those 130 patients decided to end their lives primarily 
because of depression? We’ll never know, but it is clear that any system of physician 
assisted suicide needs to identify those patients who are depressed and have them treated 
for it. 
 
 
PAS in Oregon and Washington 
 In November of 1994 Oregon made history by becoming the first state in the 
United States to legalize the practice of physician assisted suicide. The Oregon Death 
with Dignity Act (DWDA) was a citizen’s initiative that passed by the narrowest margin 
possible, 51% in favor.50 The law did not take effect in 1994, however. It was delayed by 
legal injunction until the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals lifted the injunction on October 
27, 1997.51 An appeal to the United States Supreme Court was subsequently denied. Once 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals lifted the legal injunction, the Oregon DWDA came 
into effect. In November of the same year a measure was placed on the general election 
ballot asking voters to repeal the DWDA. This measure, Measure 51, failed by a margin 
of 60% to 40%.52 Four years later, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft pronounced a 
new interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). All of the medications 
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  Smith. 
49
  MSNBC. 
50
  “Death with Dignity Act History,” Oregon Department of Human Services, March 2006, < 
http://www. oregon.gov /DHS /ph/pas/docs/History.pdf>. Hereafter cited as DWDA History.  
51
  DWDA History. 
52
  DWDA History. 
  
prescribed under the Oregon DWDA have been barbiturates. Under the Controlled 
Substances Act, a barbiturate is a controlled substance; therefore, Attorney General 
Ashcroft interpreted the CSA in such a way that would make it illegal for physicians to 
prescribe any barbiturate to a patient for use under the DWDA.53 Essentially, Ashcroft 
hoped to eliminate physician assisted suicide as a legal option available to terminally ill, 
mentally competent Oregon residents. Ashcroft’s interpretation was, of course, met with 
another round of litigation. The State of Oregon filed suit in U.S. District Court and the 
court issued a temporary restraining order against Ashcroft’s interpretation of the CSA. 
In April of 2002, the district court upheld the DWDA and basically nullified Ashcroft’s 
interpretation. Ashcroft appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and his appeal 
was subsequently denied.54 Normally, a circuit court of appeals will hear a case with a 
three judge panel, however, if a petitioner appeals for the court to hear the case en banc, 
all of the judges on that circuit court of appeals will sit in on the hearing of a case. 
Following the rejection of his appeal, Ashcroft appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals to hear the case en banc and the eleven judge panel rejected his appeal. Ashcroft 
then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and the Court agreed to hear the case. In 
January of 2006, the Court announced its decision affirming the district court’s 
decision.55 The DWDA remained in effect during this entire legal battle. 
 Under the Oregon DWDA, any adult resident of Oregon who is deemed to be 
suffering from a terminal illness and who is considered capable may make a written 
request for medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a dignified and humane 
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54
  DWDA History. 
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  DWDA History. 
  
manner.56 The act defines “terminal illness” as “an incurable and irreversible disease that 
has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce 
death within six months.”57 The term “capable” means that the patient is, in the opinion 
of physicians, psychiatrists or psychologists, able to make and communicate important 
health care decisions.58 The act expressly states that only Oregon residents can request 
the medical means to end their lives. The act lays forth several qualifications for Oregon 
residency: the possession of an Oregon driver’s license, registration to vote in Oregon, 
evidence of property ownership in Oregon or evidence that property is being leased in 
Oregon, or the filing of an Oregon tax return for the most recent year.59  
 Pursuant to the Oregon DWDA, a patient who wishes to end his or her life 
through medical means must follow a certain procedure. A patient must first make a 
written request that follows a certain form. This written statement must be signed and 
dated and this signing must be witnessed by two individuals. At least one of the 
individuals must not be a person who is a relative of the patient, is entitled to any portion 
of the patient’s estate after the patient’s death, is an owner or employee of a health care 
facility where the patient is receiving care, or  is the patient’s own doctor. The witnesses 
must attest to their belief that the patient is “capable, acting voluntarily, and is not being 
coerced to sign the request.”60 The patient’s physician, upon receiving the request, is 
required to inform the patient of alternatives to ending his or her life and to refer the 
patient to a consulting physician. The act also stipulates that the physician should 
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determine that the patient is capable, acting voluntarily, and is making an informed 
decision and that the physician request, but not compel, the patient to inform the patient’s 
next of kin about the decision.61 The consulting physician is required to confirm the 
initial physician’s diagnosis and prognosis in writing.62 If, at any time, either physician 
feels that the patient’s judgment is in any way impaired, they are required to refer the 
patient for psychological and/or psychiatric counseling.63 In addition to the written 
request, a patient needs to make an oral request to the physician as well. After a waiting 
period of at least fifteen days, this oral request must be repeated to the physician.64 The 
physician is required to inform the patient that he or she has the right to rescind the 
request at any time. Additionally, all aspects of the process need to be recorded in the 
patient’s medical file.  
 Once the patient has received the prescription from the physician, the patient is 
not allowed to ingest the medication in a public place. Upon ingesting the medication, the 
patient’s life, health, or accident insurance policy will be unaffected. The act further 
expressly prohibits the ending of a patient’s life through lethal injection, mercy killing or 
euthanasia.65 Additionally, any person who is found to coerce or exert undue influence on 
a patient to request medication to end life is subject to a Class A Felony charge.66  
 The Oregon DWDA also stipulates that the Oregon Department of Human 
Services is responsible for compiling data about the patients who end their lives through 
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this practice. So far, from the beginning of 1998 to the end of 2008, a total of 401 
terminally ill Oregonians have ended their lives in accordance with the law.67 Of the 401 
patients, slightly more have been male (53.1%), most have had at least some college 
education (66.8%), and an overwhelming majority have been Caucasian (97.5%).68 A 
majority of the patients have private health insurance (66.8%). With the exception of five 
patients who had no health insurance and four patients for whom health insurance 
information was unknown, the remaining patients were insured by either Medicare or 
Medicaid.69 In their data compilation, the Oregon Department of Human Services also 
assembles the patient’s reasons for making the choice to end their lives with medical 
means. Of the 401 DWDA patients who ended their lives, 89.9% cited “loss of 
autonomy” as an end-of-life concern, 83.8% cited “loss of dignity,” and 38.3% cited 
“burden on family, friends/caregivers” as a one of the reasons for requesting medical 
means to end their lives. Surprisingly, given the high cost of health care and end-of-life 
care, only 11 patients (2.8%) cited “financial implications of treatment” as an end-of-life 
concern.70 Additionally, 95% of the deaths that have occurred in accordance with this act 
have been complication free and the median duration between the patient’s first request 
and the patient’s death is 43 days.71 
 Since the practice has only been legal for just a little over ten years, proponents 
and opponents alike are generally unsure whether this practice has adequate safeguards to 
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prevent the expansion experienced in the Netherlands. Proponents, as will be discussed 
further in the following pages, point to the fact that not every patient whose request for 
the medication is granted, ends up using the medication to end his or her life. From the 
time that the legislation has been in full effect to the end of 2008, 628 prescriptions have 
been written.72 As mentioned above, 401 patients have ended their lives pursuant to the 
act. This means that 36% of those who receive a prescription for the medication to end 
their lives choose not to use it. The chart on the following page, provided by the Oregon 
Department of Human Services, illustrates graphically the number of prescriptions 
written since 1998 and the number of deaths from ingestion of the medication: 
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It seems as though, for a substantial portion of patients, just knowing that ending 
their lives through medical means was an option was comfort enough.74 However, 
opponents of the practice argue that the program is dangerous because it gets its 
information almost exclusively from self-reporting doctors. Also, opponents of the 
Oregon DWDA point to the fact that a cancer patient who had been hospitalized for 
mental illness received a prescription for the medical means to end his life despite the 
fact that his doctor told a court that the patient could be “susceptible to periods of 
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confusion and impaired judgment.”75 Some opponents of physician assisted suicide are 
not persuaded that Oregon’s safeguards are sufficient enough to contain the practice. 
 From 1975 up through the new millennium, the state of Washington had a statute 
making the practice of physician assisted suicide illegal. That statute was the subject of a 
long legal battle that eventually made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, discussed in the 
following pages. In November of 2008, however, the citizens of Washington passed the 
Washington Death with Dignity Act by a margin of 57.8% to 42.2%.76 Washington’s 
legislation is identical to the legislation of Oregon with respect to each of the elements of 
the Oregon DWDA cited above.77 The act went into full effect on March 5th 2009.78 As 
the act has just taken effect, data about its participants has yet to be reported. 
 
PAS and the Supreme Court 
 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution states that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”79 The cases that were brought to the U.S. Supreme Court 
regarding physician assisted suicide legislation involved interpretation of this clause. The 
Fourteenth Amendment applies some, but not all, of the Bill of Rights to the state 
governments. Additionally, the idea behind substantive due process is that there are 
certain rights that are not expressly protected in the Constitution but are nevertheless 
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fundamental.80 In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, decided in 1990, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that, “it cannot be disputed that the Due Process Clause 
protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining treatment.”81 
While the Court in Cruzan upheld a Missouri statute that required clear and convincing 
proof of a patient’s wishes to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment when that 
patient was unable to communicate those wishes, the Court held that a fundamental right 
of a patient to choose to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment existed in the 
Constitution. 
 In 1997 the Court heard arguments in it first ever case dealing with physician 
assisted suicide. In Washington v. Glucksberg the Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
Washington statute that made it a crime to assist another in an act of suicide. Physician 
Harold Glucksberg, three other physicians, and three terminally ill patients in 
Washington brought suit against the State, arguing that the right of a mentally competent, 
terminally ill patient to choose to end his or her life through a physician assisted suicide 
is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.82 The Supreme 
Court rejected this argument and held that there is no fundamental right to assisted 
suicide in the U.S. Constitution. In writing the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist explained the centuries-long tradition of the rejection of suicide. 
Rehnquist explained that if the Court were to find a fundamental right of an individual to 
end his or her life through the practice of physician assisted suicide, the Court would 
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“have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered 
policy choice of almost every State.”83  
 In the Court’s opinion in Glucksberg, Rehnquist explained the rights of 
individuals that the Court has recognized as fundamental, and therefore protected by the 
Due Process Clause, in their previous cases. These liberties include the rights to marry, to 
have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, to marital 
privacy, to the use of contraception, to bodily integrity, to abortion, and to refuse 
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.84 Rehnquist further explained that in order for a 
right to be recognized by the Court as being fundamental it must be “deeply rooted in the 
Nation’s history and tradition” and be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”85 In the 
case of physician assisted suicide, it was clear to the Court that the practice is neither 
“deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition” nor “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.” Even if legislation does not infringe upon the exercise of a fundamental 
right, it still must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. In this case, 
the Court found the Washington legislation to have a relation to six state interests: the 
preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the avoidance of the possibility of undue 
influence on the patient from third parties, the protection of family members of the 
patient, the protection of the integrity of the medical profession and the avoidance of a 
future movement toward euthanasia.86 The Washington ban on PAS was therefore 
upheld. 
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 Will there never be a right to PAS in the U.S. Constitution? It is of course 
possible that the Court will overturn itself. This is a rare occurrence but it does happen 
from time to time. Most law professionals and scholars agree that trying to determine 
how any court will rule in the future is risky and inaccurate because, in large part, the 
way a court will decide an issue or case depends on the composition of the court.87 It 
seems doubtful that the Court will reverse itself anytime soon because, as Rehnquist 
explained in his opinion, there is no sense in society of an emerging recognition of a right 
to PAS.88 However, if an awareness of such a right did begin to emerge, the Court may 
have to reconsider its position one day. The Court seems to be indicating that any change 
of their position on PAS needs to be initiated by a change in society’s attitudes towards 
the practice.89 Additionally, just because the U.S. Supreme Court declines to find a 
fundamental right in the U.S. Constitution, that does not mean that the state supreme 
courts must also decline to find the same fundamental right in their state constitutions. 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Glucksberg, any state supreme court is still free to 
find a fundamental right to physician assisted suicide in their state constitution.90  
 In the same term as Glucksberg, the Court also heard a case involving a physician 
assisted suicide ban in New York. A New York law, which allows a patient to refuse life 
saving medical treatment, makes assistance in an act of suicide a crime. In Vacco v. Quill, 
three physicians and three terminally ill patients brought suit against various public 
                                                 
87
  Bruce Wolpert, Esq., interview by author, Providence, Rhode Island, 17 April 2009. Also, 
Bender, interview by author. 
88
  Yale Kamisar, “Can Glucksberg Survive Lawrence? Another Look at the End of Life and 
Personal Autonomy,” Issues in Law and Medicine, Fall 2008: 110. 
89
  Bender, interview by author. 
90
  Bender, interview by author. 
  
officials, arguing that because the New York statute allows a mentally competent person 
to refuse life-sustaining or lifesaving medical treatment, which is “essentially the same 
thing” as PAS, but denies the choice of physician assisted suicide, it violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.”91 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits a State from denying “to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.”92 In this case, the Court rejected the physicians’ arguments and upheld the 
constitutionality of the New York statute. Writing the opinion of the Court was again 
Chief Justice Rehnquist who explained that if the right in question is not a fundamental 
one, the Court will generally uphold the legislation as long as it doesn’t target a suspect 
class and it has a rational relation to a legitimate governmental interest.93 In this case, the 
Court decided that the New York statute did not target a suspect class and that it had a 
rational relation to the same governmental interests highlighted in the Glucksberg case. 
 Furthermore, the Court rejected the physicians’ argument that PAS and the refusal 
of life-sustaining treatment is essentially the same thing. Rehnquist explained that the 
“distinction between assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment…is both 
important and logical.”94 Rehnquist then discussed how a physician who withdraws life-
sustaining treatment from a patient is simply honoring the patient’s wishes. Similarly, he 
argues, when a doctor provides a patient with aggressive palliative care that may hasten 
death, the “physician’s purpose and intent is, or may be only to ease his patient’s pain. A 
doctor who assists a suicide, however, ‘must necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily 
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that the patient be made dead.’”95 The importance of a physician’s intent in a given act is 
discussed in more detail later in this paper. 
 
PAS in Rhode Island 
 In his opinion in Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed the long legal 
tradition of the rejection of suicide. To further his argument, Rehnquist referenced the 
legislators of Providence Plantations declaration in 1647 that “‘self-murder is by all 
agreed to be the most unnatural.”’96 Three hundred forty-nine years later, the Rhode 
Island General Assembly made physician assisted illegal. In 1996 the General Assembly 
passed this legislation based on the reasoning that the “state requires that vulnerable 
persons be protected from suicide.”97 This law makes any individual who knowingly 
either provides the physical means by which another commits or attempts to commit 
suicide or participates in the act of suicide or attempted suicide of another guilty of a 
felony. Upon conviction, the guilty party may be punished by up to ten years 
imprisonment, by a fine of up to $10,000 or both.98 Additionally, the statute expressly 
exempts any health care professional who either dispenses pain medication, in order to 
relieve pain, that may hasten death, or withholds or withdraws a life sustaining procedure 
from a patient at the patient’s requests, from any liability.99 
 While the RI General Assembly may prohibit the practice of physician assisted 
suicide, the legislature does acknowledge that the terminally ill have certain fundamental 
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rights. Chief among these rights is the fundamental right to have life-sustaining 
procedures withheld or withdrawn at the terminal patient’s request.100 In certain cases, 
communication of a patient’s wishes becomes impossible. Under a scenario of this type, a 
patient may create a durable power of attorney for health care.101 In accordance with this 
statute, a person may sign a document, in the presence of two witnesses who attest to the 
patient’s mental and emotional state, which expresses the patient’s desires regarding 
medical treatment if the patient becomes unable to communicate them. The patient 
further authorizes a person of the patient’s choosing to make health care decisions for the 
patient in accordance with the document if the patient becomes unable to do so.102 
Furthermore, the Health Care Power of Attorney statute stipulates that the fundamental 
right to withhold or withdraw medical care is not impaired in any way and that all 
decisions made in accordance with the patient’s durable power of attorney for health care 
will be respected.103  
 Despite Rhode Island’s law against the practice of physician assisted suicide, 
some lawmakers in the General Assembly have made efforts to legalize PAS. In 1996, 
before the statute making PAS illegal was in effect, the RI Senate Judiciary Committee 
held hearings on bills to legalize and criminalize physician assisted suicide. After the 
hearings, the Committee voted by a margin of 12-0 to criminalize the practice and that 
version of the bill went on to the full Senate.104 In both 1998 and 2007 legislators in the 
                                                 
100
  RI Gen.Laws, 1956, § 23-4.11-1. 
101
  RI Gen.Laws, 1956, § 23-4.10-3. 
102
  RI Gen.Laws, 1956, § 23-4.10.3. 
103
  RI Gen.Laws, 1956, § 23-4.10.9. 
104
  Felice J. Freyer, “A Time to Die,” The Providence Journal, 16 February 1997, Special Report: 
Section 1, p. 5, p. 12. 
  
House proposed bills that were nearly identical to the Oregon DWDA. The measures 
proved to be unsuccessful.105 At the time of this writing, the practice of physician assisted 
suicide is still illegal in the state of Rhode Island and if we are to move forward with the 
legalization of the practice, we will have to examine the ethical dimensions of the issue. 
Issues 
Personal Choice 
 Perhaps the strongest argument for legalizing physician assisted suicide is that it 
enhances the options available to a patient suffering from a terminal illness. In America 
great weight and importance is given to an individual’s right to make critical life choices. 
Several examples of this freedom of individual choice abound in our society. It is widely 
accepted in American culture that individuals have the right to choose a career, whom to 
marry, where to live, and several other aspects of their personal life.  
Proponents of physician assisted suicide feel that this individual freedom of 
choice should naturally extend to the questions of how and when to die. Even opponents 
of PAS recognize that this is a strong argument in favor of this practice. According to Dr. 
Stephen D. Schwarz, a philosophy and ethics professor at the University of Rhode Island, 
the principle of autonomy as applied to the case of physician assisted suicide consists of 
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the argument that a person’s life is their own and not that of the community or of the 
government.106 This argument is furthered rather effectively by Paul Chamberlain in his 
book Final Wishes: A Cautionary Tale on Death, Dignity, & Physician-Assisted Suicide. 
In this book, Chamberlain uses a fictional story to highlight the several issues of the 
physician assisted suicide debate. Chamberlain explains the individual choice argument 
through one of his characters who says, “People want information, options and choices so 
they can participate in the decision-making process with their physicians. After all, whose 
life is it?”107 This question raises a very valid point. If so much respect and deference is 
given to individual choice in the area of important life decisions, it follows naturally to 
those advocating PAS that this freedom of choice should extend to decisions surrounding 
the end of one’s life. Indeed, as Dr. Alfred G. Killilea, a Political Science professor at the 
University of Rhode Island, put it, “if a person doesn’t have control over the ending of 
their life, what kind of freedom do they have?”108 Furthermore, argue the proponents of 
physician assisted suicide, refusing to legalize physician assisted suicide is too 
paternalistic. Proponents argue that patients do not want to simply be told what is best for 
them; they want to be active participants in their medical care process and they want to 
have a wide assortment of choices available to them.109 Physician assisted suicide should 
be one of these options, according its supporters. 
While proponents lay out strong arguments for legalization of physician assisted 
suicide on individual choice grounds, opponents of this practice do see some problems 
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with this line of reasoning. Those against physician assisted suicide are quick to point out 
that the right of individual choice is not unlimited. Schwarz offers several examples 
where personal autonomy must be restricted for the good of society. Far from being a 
“blanket right,” he argues that an individual freedom is constantly being curtailed by 
things like traffic laws and laws against the possession or use of drugs.110 In Schwarz’s 
opinion, laws against prostitution offer a perfect example of society’s limiting of personal 
autonomy for the common good. If someone is consistently pro-choice for a woman’s 
right over her body, he argues, prostitution should be viewed as a purely individual act.111 
Chamberlain extends this rationale and argues that “PAS is not a purely private act,” and 
that any legislation dealing with physician assisted suicide will have to take into account 
potential effects on society.112 
Certainly Chamberlain and Schwarz are correct in their analysis, as several rights 
that may at first seem private do have considerable effects on society. Opponents of 
physician assisted suicide have additional criticisms of the personal choice arguments of 
the supporters of PAS. In his book, Chamberlain puts forth the argument that in the 
situation of physician assisted suicide, the individual does not really make the decision of 
when to end their life. He believes that the final decision rests with the government.113 In 
a dialogue that he sets up between two characters, Chamberlain compares the approval 
process of applying for physician assisted suicide assistance to that of getting a driver’s 
license. In both situations, the government must approve the individual’s request for 
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certification. Then, he argues, the analogy breaks down. According to Chamberlain, once 
a person receives a driver’s license, the decision of when to use that freedom is up to the 
individual. In PAS, he reasons, that final decision rests with others and “all the suffering 
person can do is put in his request and wait to have his fate decided by someone else.”114 
Chamberlain’s analysis, if true, would be severely damaging to the individual 
choice arguments for the legalization of physician assisted suicide. I believe, however, 
that Chamberlain’s analogy actually would be workable if it was slightly revised. I think 
that Chamberlain fails to recognize that the final choice rests with the patient, not with 
others. One can reason that the acceptance of one’s request for physician aid in dying is 
similar to the issuance of a driver’s license. If a terminally-ill patient’s request for 
physician assisted suicide is approved, there is no condition that he or she must go 
through with it. Like the decision by a licensed motor vehicle operator to go out for a 
drive, the ultimate decision of whether to go through with a PAS procedure is the 
individual’s. In the case of PAS, of course, the “drive” can be taken only once and will 
not be returned from. The fact remains, in a significant number of Oregonians approved 
for PAS procedures, the patients declined to exercise this option. In this situation it 
appears as though people just want to know that they have the option and the choice to 
end their lives with the help of a physician should they need it. Killilea believes that this 
“represents an opportunity to assert control over your life and once people get that, their 
decision sometimes is not to use it.”115 It seems as though Chamberlain was mistaken in 
his analysis of with whom the final decision rests. 
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 Several terminally ill patients cite concerns about loss of autonomy and loss of 
dignity as reasons for making requests for physician assisted suicide. According to Dr. Ira 
Byock, former President of the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine, 
the phrase, “‘I feel so undignified,’ is a constant refrain among terminally ill people 
whose personhood is being assaulted from all directions.”116 Terminally ill patients have 
trouble adjusting to being dependent on others for daily care. In the data released by the 
Oregon Department of Human Services, these concerns are all too apparent. Of the 401 
people who have died from 1998-2008 from a lethal injection pursuant to the Oregon 
DWDA, 89.9% cited “loss of autonomy” as a concern and 83.8% cited “loss of dignity” 
as a concern for seeking to end their lives through physician assisted suicide.117 How can 
these concerns be adequately addressed? In the minds of proponents of PAS, the answer 
to this question is again one of personal choice. Many terminally ill patients want all of 
the issues to be on the table in combating their main aspects of suffering.118 
 Opponents of physician assisted suicide also see these feelings among the 
terminally ill as problematic, but they do not see the legalization of physician assisted 
suicide as the appropriate way to address these concerns. Many of those who oppose PAS 
blame society for fostering this notion that equates the loss of one’s autonomy to the loss 
of one’s dignity. Byock points out that, “society reinforces the belief that the loss of 
normal capability and independence renders a person undignified.”119 Byock and others 
suggest that the notion of dignity as physical independence needs to be shed by 
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society.120     Agreeing with Byock, Schwarz suggests that there are different levels of 
dignity. He argues that most people’s idea of what dignity is actually is what he calls 
“secondary dignity.” As an example of this kind of dignity, Schwarz put forth the 
scenario in which a person was attending a fancy dinner in a beautiful mansion wearing 
dapper attire. According to Schwarz, the real or primary dignity is retained by an 
individual no matter what physical state that individual is in. In Schwarz’s mind, even if a 
person is on the operating table or is losing control of bodily functions, the primary 
dignity is still retained.121 It seems that Chamberlain agrees with both Schwarz and 
Byock on this point, concluding that, “You don’t lose your dignity just because you lose 
control of your body.”122 Most opponents of physician assisted suicide are in agreement 
that changing society’s notions of dignity is the proper response to address these concerns 
of the terminally ill. 
 
Being a Burden on Others and the Danger of Coercion 
 Similar to the feelings about loss of autonomy and loss of control, feelings about 
being a burden on others often lead terminally ill patients to request for the medical 
means to end their lives. Though not as prevalent as the concerns mentioned above, 
feeling like a burden on others is a relatively common thing for those with terminal 
illnesses. According to the Oregon Department of Human Services, 38.3% of those who 
died in accordance with the Oregon DWDA cited “burden on family, friends/caregivers” 
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as an end-of-life concern.123 A study done by Northwestern University yielded strikingly 
similar results; 46% of those who made a request for some assistance in suicide cited 
being a burden on others as one of several factors for making that request.124 Proponents 
believe that PAS should be one of many legal options available to those suffering from a 
terminal illness. 
 Opponents of physician assisted suicide see a more practical and less dangerous 
way of adequately addressing the feelings of being a burden on others that many with 
terminal illnesses have. Many of those against this practice believe that, like society’s 
notions of dignity, society’s negative notion of the sick and elderly as “burdens” needs to 
change. Kiki Latimer, a teaching assistant to Dr. Schwarz, explains that, “This concept 
that we shouldn’t be a burden to other people is a false concept.”125 She explains that by 
caring for the sick and elderly, people learn to care for each other in a very real way. 
Being a burden on others is part of the human package and is simply sometimes the 
reality of our relationship with others.126 Relying on his experience in the field of hospice 
and palliative care, Byock explains that in many cases caregivers come to appreciate their 
time spent with the dying as precious.127 Byock agrees that the terminally ill need to 
change their negative views about becoming burdens and realize that sometimes, 
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accepting care can be the most important and meaningful thing that a terminally ill 
patient can do for their loved ones.128  
 Due to the burden that several terminally ill patients feel they are imposing on 
their friends and families, opponents of physician assisted suicide see legalization of the 
practice as extremely dangerous. Depending on the study used, Northwestern University 
estimates that anywhere from 25-77% of the patients suffering from serious illnesses 
have persistent depression symptoms. Even more disturbing is the university’s findings 
that depression is undiagnosed and untreated in roughly two out of three such cases.129 
Given the vulnerable state of the elderly and the terminally ill, many opponents of PAS 
legislation argue that several terminally ill patients will be coerced to choose PAS in 
order to not be a burden on friends and families. Several of those who oppose the practice 
are worried about the terminally ill developing what some call a “duty to die.”130 While 
opponents of physician assisted suicide acknowledge the proponents’ claim that in theory 
PAS would be strictly voluntary, many fear that in practice coercion presents a big 
problem. Sometimes a simple suggestion or a look of stress on the face of a caregiver 
could indirectly influence a terminally ill patient’s decision to end their life through legal, 
medical means.131 Other opponents of PAS see patients having to justify their own 
existence to themselves. With all of the issues that terminally ill patients must deal with, 
such as the feeling that they are burdens to their caregivers coupled with the legality of 
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PAS, some patients may decide that they have a duty to die, not because they really want 
to but because they are unable to justify their own existence.132 For those who oppose 
physician assisted suicide, the danger of subtle coercion is too great to risk legalizing the 
practice. 
 While this point is certainly a valid and frightening one, in the eyes of some 
proponents of PAS, this train of thought is too paternalistic. Although it is important to 
acknowledge the vulnerability of the elderly and the terminally ill, it is equally important 
to acknowledge that we are not talking about children. The elderly and the terminally ill 
in question are adults nonetheless and they can be expected to know the difference 
between a right and a duty, argue those in favor of legalizing physician assisted 
suicide.133 A conflict exists here between individual choice and society attempting to 
promote the common good. The argument of government knowing what is best for the 
people is not one that sits particularly well with some members of American society. For 
proponents of physician assisted suicide, intense vigilance over the process is the 
appropriate way to address this concern.134 
 While the two sides may debate about the appropriate response to the feelings of 
being a burden on others felt by terminally ill patients, there is no ignoring the fact that, 
financially speaking, end-of-life care is extremely costly. In a study cited by 
Northwestern University, 31% of families lost “most of their savings caring for a loved 
one.” In a second study, “40% of families caring for a person cancer became 
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impoverished” as a result of the treatment.135 These stark financial figures lead many who 
oppose physician assisted suicide to conclude that patients will be pushed to choose death 
as a cost-cutting measure. Richard Doerflinger explains that if PAS becomes accepted 
and, “life-extending care of the terminally ill is increasingly seen as strictly elective, 
society may become less willing to appropriate funds for such care, and economic 
pressures to choose death will grow accordingly.”136 Doerflinger is certainly not alone in 
this fear. Indeed, this position also finds support from the U.S. Supreme Court. In the 
Glucksberg case, discussed above, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that “if physician-
assisted suicide were permitted, many might resort to it to spare their families the 
substantial financial burden of end-of-life health-care costs.”137 
 This danger of coercion is very real and, with the high cost of end-of-life care, 
opponents of PAS are correct to be wary. If physician assisted suicide were legalized in 
several states in America under the current system of health care, an ominous trend may 
develop – poorer patients overwhelmingly choosing to end their lives through physician 
assisted suicide with more affluent patients choosing to spend money to trying to 
alleviate their pain. This is a legitimate concern but it does not necessarily suggest that 
physician assisted suicide legislation is entirely unworkable. Some proponents of PAS 
answer their critics’ problems with physician assisted suicide by arguing that a system of 
universal health care needs to be set up.138 Even today, Killilea argues, one can see the 
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problem that personal wealth poses under our current system of health care. Medical 
problems that are solvable to the more affluent members of society are nearly impossible 
ones to solve for the poorer members of our society. As a result, they must accept a 
speedy death as a result of their inability to afford expensive treatment and the end result 
of our current system is that, “people with more resources or with better luck, better 
circumstances, can live longer.”139 
 
The Danger of Expansion 
 Perhaps the strongest argument made by the opponents of physician assisted 
suicide is that, once PAS legislation is enacted, the possibility for expansion will be too 
great. Sometimes referred to as “slippery slope” or “loose cannon” arguments, these 
concerns consist of the belief that there are no adequate roadblocks to prevent the 
deterioration of the practice to encompass unintended cases.140 What opponents of PAS 
see as one of the major problems with the “roadblocks” set up by the Oregon and 
Washington laws is the definition of terminal illness. They are quick to point out that 
there is nothing sacred about the current six month requirement of a “terminal illness.”141 
If it is considered humane, opponents argue, to allow someone with six months to live to 
choose to end their life through physician assisted suicide, surely it would be more 
humane to allow someone with nine months to live to make the same choice. If it is 
allowed for people with nine months to live, surely it is more humane to allow someone 
who will suffer for twelve months to chose to end their life through medical means. It 
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seems strange to some critics of PAS that a person in the early stages of a destructive 
disease like Alzheimer’s will be ineligible for PAS because the disease has not 
progressed far enough.142 For many opponents of the practice, the problem with terminal 
illness as a requirement for PAS is that the word “terminal” is a very relative term. 
Comparing the word “terminal” to words such as “near” and “far,” Schwarz argues that 
their relativity often makes their use rather vague.143 
 The gradual expansion of the time period of what constitutes a terminal illness is 
especially dangerous because it is very rational on a step-by-step basis. The argument for 
small expansion is very strong and each small expansion serves as rationale for yet 
another small expansion. Before too long, the result is often drastic, unintended 
consequences that seemed preposterous before the legislation was enacted.144 Many 
opponents of physician assisted suicide see this potential for seemingly rational 
expansion, coupled with the effects of coercion and the desires of the terminally ill not to 
be burdens on their friends and families, leading PAS legislation down a dark and dismal 
path.145 Indeed, some of those opposed to physician assisted suicide argue, that path has 
already been mapped out for us in the experience with PAS in the Netherlands. As 
mentioned above, the courts in the Netherlands have readily expanded the definition of 
terminal illness when called upon to do so. Such a broad definition of terminal illness 
may seem unreasonable to many PAS proponents in this country but, argue the 
opponents, that is exactly what makes the slippery slope arguments so dangerous – the 
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fact that some consequences that naturally follow from reasoning, as some would argue 
occurred in the Netherlands, seem impossible to those advocating PAS before it is on the 
books. 
 Furthermore, the possibility for expansion of the terminal illness requirement also 
presents the parallel of an Equal Protection argument. Some opponents of physician 
assisted suicide see an inconsistency in allowing suffering terminally ill patients to seek 
medical means to end their lives while, at the same time, refusing to allow those suffering 
mental or emotional anxiety to do the same. Chamberlain suggests that it is an 
inconsistent principle to allow some people who are suffering the choice to end their life 
while denying this choice to others.146 Indeed, there have been several documented cases 
in the Netherlands of physically healthy people, enduring severe emotional and/or mental 
suffering, who are put to death at their request.147 Can any set of physician assisted 
suicide legislation justify this distinction? 
 The arguments that opponents offer under the broad category of “slippery slope” 
arguments are valid ones, and ones with much merit. If it were impossible to argue 
against these positions, physician assisted legislation would seem to be simply too 
dangerous to enact. Proponents do acknowledge that the definition of terminal illness in 
PAS legislation is often vague and imprecise and they strongly urge that intense vigilance 
will have to be used to safeguard against any such “slip.” On the other hand, while six 
months is a vague and imprecise limit, it is at least a starting point. Some advocates of 
physician assisted suicide claim that the six month requirement is better than turning a 
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blind eye to the needs of suffering terminally ill patients.148 I would argue that the 
dangers suggested by those against PAS are both very possible and very horrendous.  
Due to these dangers, I believe, a legal justification exists to keep the terminal 
illness definition at six months. As mentioned above, the Supreme Court declined to find 
a constitutional fundamental right of a person to choose to end their lives through a 
physician assisted suicide. As it stands now, with no fundamental constitutional right to 
physician assisted suicide existing in the U.S. Constitution or any state constitution (the 
Oregon and Washington laws are statutory grants of the right, not constitutional), any 
PAS legislation being challenged by someone with an illness that will become terminal 
but that is currently outside the six month scope will most likely be upheld under the 
rational basis test.149 Recall from the discussion of physician assisted suicide and the 
Supreme Court that legislation that burdens neither a fundamental right nor targets a 
suspect class will generally be upheld as long as it has some rational relation to a 
legitimate governmental interest. In Glucksberg, one of the governmental interests that 
the Supreme Court recognized that the State of Washington was trying to protect was the 
interest in “avoiding future movement toward euthanasia and other abuses.”150 Certainly 
it is conceivable that a court would hold that legislation that limits the right to physician 
assisted suicide to those with a terminal illness as having six months to live passes the 
rational basis test. 
Additionally, let’ s say, for the sake of argument, that the Court does reverse 
itself, overturn Glucksberg, and recognize a fundamental right to physician assisted 
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suicide or that a state court recognizes a fundamental right in a state constitution to PAS. 
It is still possible for legislation that limits the practice to those with six months to live to 
be upheld. When legislation burdens a fundamental right, it must pass the strict scrutiny 
test. One of the hardest tests to pass in constitutional law, the strict scrutiny test requires 
that legislation infringing on the exercise of a fundamental right be narrowly tailored, so 
as to not place an undue burden on the right, and to advance a compelling state interest.151 
Courts will usually recognize that legislatures are engaged in arbitrary line drawing quite 
frequently. If the legislation in question were to give some legislative findings, pointing 
to the facts of the practice of PAS in the Netherlands and arguing that the six month 
requirement of the legislation was an essential roadblock necessary to prevent the 
practice from unintended consequences, then it is possible, but not certain, that a court 
would uphold this legislation as passing the strict scrutiny test.152 
 Similarly, some advocates of physician assisted suicide believe it is important to 
make a distinction between physician assisted suicides and other suicides. In some 
people’s minds a “traditional suicide” involves the ending of a living process while PAS 
involves the ending of a dying process.153 Although this line of thought is rejected by 
many opponents of physician assisted suicide, I think it is an important distinction to 
make. Typically, terminally ill patients who request to end their lives through medical 
means are considered to be in the dying process – there is no real hope of recovery.154 
Conversely, a physically healthy person who is suffering form mental or emotional 
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anguish is in no imminent threat of death and is, therefore, in what can be called a living 
process.155 This argument was attempted, at least in part, by the attorneys of the 
physicians in both the Glucksberg and Quill cases.156 This serves as a valuable basis for 
making a possible legal distinction between these two types of cases, thereby 
circumventing the argument that those suffering from mental and emotional distress 
would also be entitled to end their lives through physician assisted suicide. If this 
difference is established and the two types of situations are adequately differentiated, 
physician assisted suicide can legally condone one type of suicide, ending a dying 
process, while simultaneously not condoning all other suicide, ending a living process. 
While this approach may seem like technical hair-splitting at first, an important legal 
distinction may result. As discussed above, physician assisted suicide can potentially be 
upheld as constitutional in the face of Equal Protection claims brought against it, whether 
the right to physician assisted suicide is fundamental or not. For the same reasons 
mentioned in the above discussions of the rational basis test and the strict scrutiny test, it 
seems as though it is possible to legally contain the practice to mentally competent, 
terminally ill individuals who have six months or less to live. 
 Some proponents of physician assisted suicide attack the slippery slope argument 
on the grounds that the possibility of abuse is not a sufficient reason to destroy the 
possible liberty.157 Even some of those who oppose PAS, like Latimer, see a problem 
with using the slippery slope argument as a means to proscribe physician assisted suicide 
legislation. She uses an example of building a new highway to illustrate her point. With 
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the construction of a new highway come the obvious risks of more accidents, more drunk 
drivers, etc., but these risks are not sufficient to preclude construction of the highway. In 
Latimer’s mind, “if I do have a right to physician assisted suicide, I don’t think that right 
should be taken away just because, down the line, somebody may abuse that right.158 
While Schwarz agrees that Latimer’s reasoning is valid in most cases, he believes 
strongly there are some cases in which potential dangers are so immense and threatening 
that an ban on potential action is warranted. He offers the case of a biological or chemical 
agent that has some beneficial effects for humankind when handled correctly, yet is lethal 
to all humans if it gets out of the lab and into the air supply. In this case, he reasons, the 
rationale behind the slippery slope argument holds up.159 While I would agree with 
Schwarz in terms of the biological agent scenario, the critical question for me is does 
physician assisted suicide pose risks as great as the biological agent scenario or lesser 
risks, such as those found in the highway construction scenario? Although it is important 
not to undermine the seriousness of the effects posed in the slippery slope arguments 
against PAS, it seems as though they are clearly not as dire as the risks posed in the 
biological agent scenario. 
 Both advocates and opponents of physician assisted suicide are in agreement that 
maintaining quality of life for terminally ill patients is a top priority. When society makes 
a value judgment on peoples’ lives problems usually ensue. Those against the legalization 
of PAS argue that if the practice becomes legal, society will endorse certain lives, 
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particularly those of the disabled and the terminally ill, as lives “not worth living.”160 In 
addition to this danger, many opponents of physician assisted suicide point out that many 
currents in society have longstanding prejudice towards the disabled. This combination of 
prejudice and the notion that certain lives are “not worth living” could further mix with 
the potential problems listed above and increase the risk that PAS legislation succumbs to 
a “slippery slope.”161  
 Like any issue in this contentious debate, where each side has an answer for one 
another’s problems, proponents of physician assisted suicide have a response to these 
allegations about society placing values on people’s lives. Firstly, advocates of PAS 
argue, while prejudice against those with disabilities may be prevalent in a large number 
of individuals in society, society as a whole makes conscious efforts to assist those with 
disabilities. Killilea points out that in both Portland, Oregon and Honolulu, Hawaii, all of 
the public buses are equipped with devices to assist those in wheelchairs and he reasons 
that this shows society’s efforts to provide support for and to promote the rights of the 
disabled.162 Secondly, while acknowledging the danger inherent in society deeming lives 
as “not worth living,” proponents of PAS legislation also see as problematic society’s 
deeming lives that are worth living irrespective of an individual’s value judgment. As 
Killilea puts it, “there is always going to be a problem of society not sufficiently 
appreciating the plight of the people who have misfortunes that are not generally shared 
in society.163 In a way, this argument relies on the personal choice arguments discussed 
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above. By not allowing individual’s to value their lives as “not worth living,” society 
impedes on an individual’s freedoms.  
 
Intended vs. Foreseen Consequences 
 In discussions of why physician assisted suicide should not be legalized, much is 
made of the distinction between intended consequences and consequences that are not 
intended but merely foreseen. Examples of this distinction abound in everyday life and 
Schwarz is quick to put forth a vivid example to illustrate this distinction. In scene one of 
this scenario, a doctor notices a person injured on the road. This person requires 
immediate life saving surgery and no anesthesia is available. So the doctor performs the 
surgery with the intent to save the person’s life, foreseeing that he will cause the person 
pain. In scene two of this scenario, the same physical actions are being performed by a 
sadist with the intention to inflict pain on the person. In the first situation the infliction of 
pain is merely foreseen but not intended. In the second situation the infliction of pain is 
the intent of the actions.164 Opponents of physician assisted suicide believe that this is a 
crucial distinction to always keep in mind while dealing with issues of PAS legislation. 
 In medical terms this distinction manifests itself in the distinction between mercy 
killing, including both active and passive euthanasia, and “only caring.” This distinction 
is laid out rather succinctly in Schwarz’s article Mercy Killing and Only Caring: A 
Clarification. Essentially, the tenets of this position are as follows. Whenever possible, 
good medicine aims to cure and to prevent disease but at some point in the case of a 
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terminal illness this becomes impossible. Schwarz then argues that “only caring” consists 
of either administering strong dosages of pain medication or withholding or withdrawing 
medical treatment that is pointless or very painful.165 In this case, the intent of the action 
is to make a patient’s death as comfortable as possible, even if it is reasonably foreseen 
that that the patient may die quicker. This is in direct contrast to what Schwarz and others 
call mercy killing. What is the difference between the two situations? In mercy killing, 
the intent of the act is to bring about death or to hasten it while in “only caring” the intent 
is to relieve the suffering of the patient.166 Schwarz’s contention is supported by others 
who oppose physician assisted suicide. Latimer argues that “you can do a lot to end 
suffering, including [administering] what you pretty much foresee will be a fatal dose of 
morphine or a sedative” as long as your intent is not to bring about death.167  
 The distinction between intended and merely foreseen consequences is also a big 
distinction in Catholicism. Killilea explains that the Catholic Church does not condone 
the use of condoms yet condones medical procedures like hysterectomies. With condoms, 
the effect on the pregnancy of a woman is a direct one while with hysterectomies and the 
like, the effect on the pregnancy of a woman is an indirect one.168 Opponents of PAS 
believe that legalization of this practice will signify a crossing of a threshold by 
condoning actions done with the intent to bring about death. 
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 Although the arguments for this distinction between intended and simply foreseen 
consequences are convincing, several proponents of PAS legislation are not sure that the 
distinction is as large as the opponents of PAS would have us believe. In the minds of 
some physician assisted suicide advocates, there is little to no moral difference between 
killing and letting die in circumstances where a terminally ill patient wishes to end their 
life.169 Proponents of PAS who feel this way often see an inconsistency in the current 
laws – patients on respirators, ventilators and the like are allowed to end their life by 
refusing treatment while patients without the need for respirators or ventilators but who 
still wish to end their lives are unable to do so.170 Most proponents of physician assisted 
suicide acknowledge that a distinction does exist, but they are skeptical about how large 
this distinction is. Killilea points out the contradictions of the Catholic Church’s 
adherence to the idea of the distinction as being clear-cut – they do not condone condoms 
because they value life but, as a result, the effects of this policy in Africa are the rapid 
spread of the AIDS epidemic and large numbers of unwanted pregnancies. How can the 
Church claim to value life when one of the results of this doctrine is a large amount of 
unwanted pregnancies?171 This question certainly points out that the distinction between 
intended and foreseen is not always as clear and convincing as opponents of PAS 
legislation make it out to be. 
 It seems to me that the crucial question to be answered to overcome this 
distinction is what the primary intent of the doctors who aid a patient in dying is. Is it 
really done with the intent to make a person dead? Perhaps, but is this the primary intent 
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of the action? I would argue that it is not; the primary intent of the action of the physician 
who assists a terminally ill patient in ending their life is the permanent relief of suffering. 
I’m sure opponents of the practice will argue rather forcefully that this action is done 
through the direct bringing about of a patient’s death. Admittedly, that is a direct result of 
the actions of the physician in this case. I do think, however, that those who cling to the 
idea of a huge difference between intending something to happen and merely foreseeing 
that it will happen need to acknowledge that there is often more than one intention at 
work in the performance of a certain act. These multiple intentions are of differing 
degrees of importance. I argue that more attention needs to be attributed to an act’s 
primary intention. In the case of physician assisted suicide, this act may be the only 
adequate means to relieve the pain of the terminally ill patient. After all, the act of 
physician assisted suicide is a quite permanent relief from pain for a suffering patient. In 
my mind, the primary intent of the act of physician assisted suicide is the relief of pain 
and I am hopeful that the distinction between intended and merely foreseen consequences 
will soon be viewed as a surmountable one. 
 Building on this distinction between intended and foreseen consequences of 
actions, opponents of physician assisted suicide argue that legalizing the practice could 
have a detrimental effect on the medical profession. After all, they argue, physicians 
today are called on to work tirelessly to save lives and to cure diseases and ailments. If 
we legalize PAS would this be turning doctors into killers?172 Turning to history, some 
opponents of the practice are wary that allowing doctors to focus on ending lives of 
individuals will bring a repeat of the atrocities committed during the Nazi regime’s years 
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of dominance. Doerflinger points out that many of those who conducted the “mercy 
killings” of the 1930s were readily recruited to operate the killing chambers of the 
concentration camps.173 Opponents use this analogy to argue that if the distinction 
between healing and killing is erased by PAS legislation, the whole system can once 
again succumb to the “slippery slope” and the consequences could be disastrous.  
 On this issue proponents of PAS argue that this transformation between 
attempting to save lives and aiding in the dying process is already underway. According 
to Killilea, “already…compassionate doctors see their role as helping people to die and 
helping families to accept that.”174 Proponents argue that this desire to help patients in 
their dying process is only natural in trying to achieve the patient’s wishes. Would it 
really be a monumental crossing of the Rubicon to ask doctors to continue their 
assistance to patients who are dying by asking them to assist in a patient’s desire to end 
their life through medical means? Advocates of the practice certainly don’t think so. 
 
Recommendation for Rhode Island 
 After a semester of complete and total immersion into the topic of physician 
assisted suicide, I have come to the conclusion that Rhode Island needs to adopt 
legislation similar to the laws of Oregon and Washington. While I acknowledge the very 
real potential for abuse brought up in the many strong arguments made by the opponents 
of PAS, I feel that an individual’s right to choose the course of his or her treatment 
should reign supreme. Indeed, because some of the arguments against legalizing PAS are 
                                                 
173
  Doerflinger, 319. 
174
  Killilea, interview by author. 
  
so persuasive, any successful piece of legislation enacted in RI needs to adequately 
address these problems. In particular, there are three very strong arguments against 
legalization of the practice which all PAS legislation must take into account. 
 The first problem that must be addressed is the danger of the elderly and 
terminally ill choosing to end their lives through PAS out of a feeling of a “duty to die.” 
As mentioned above, many elderly and terminally ill patients already feel like a burden to 
friends and families. Opponents of the practice argue that if PAS were legalized, patients 
would feel a need to justify their own existence. This will be increasingly difficult for 
such vulnerable patients in the years ahead, in large part because of the high cost of both 
health care in general and end-of-life care in particular. This problem will be even more 
pressing for poorer patients. Due to the very real nature of this danger, a physician 
assisted suicide law in RI will need to address this issue. I feel that the most effective way 
to address the problem would be to initiate a universal health care system in RI. While 
the implementation of this system may sound costly, keep in mind that Western European 
countries that have universal health care systems spend far less on health care per capita 
than we do here in America, as discussed in the previous pages. I believe that this is the 
only effective means of preventing all patients, and poorer patients especially, from 
choosing to end their lives out of a “duty to die.” Furthermore, the RI legislation would 
need to stipulate that physicians be extremely vigilant in determining whether a patient is 
making a request for a physician assisted suicide as a result of any undue influence from 
any friends, family members, or caregivers. 
  
 The second and third strong arguments against the legalization of the practice of 
PAS are essentially two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, argue the opponents of 
physician assisted suicide, the current definition of a terminal illness as being one in 
which the patient has six months to live will be easily expanded. If it is considered 
compassionate to allow someone suffering for six months to choose PAS, then it seems 
even more compassionate to allow someone suffering for a longer period of time the 
same choice, they argue. Critics of the practice conclude that the strong incentive for 
expansion of physician assisted suicide will prove that PAS legislation will be impossible 
to contain. Similarly, opponents of PAS argue that to differentiate between physical 
suffering, on the one hand, and mental and emotional suffering, on the other, is an unfair 
concept. They argue that the practice, if legal, will logically be expanded to be available 
to the physically healthy, mentally and/or emotionally suffering person as well. The end 
result would be a situation like that existing in the Netherlands today. 
 It is precisely because these arguments against expansion have so much merit, 
that it is essential for a RI law allowing physician assisted suicide to limit the practice to 
the mentally competent, terminally ill patients with six months to live or less. As 
discussed in the preceding pages, it is possible for a legal distinction to be made and 
enforced. Whether the RI Supreme Court finds a fundamental right to PAS in the state 
constitution or the U.S Supreme Court reverses itself and finds a fundamental right to 
PAS in the U.S. Constitution, legislation in RI that limits the practice can conceivably be 
upheld if the State makes the argument that the legislation is narrowly tailored and 
advances a compelling state interest. By explaining legislative findings in the proposed 
  
legislation that detail the dangers of the practice if it is not held in check, the State may 
successfully contain the practice. If both the RI Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme 
Court decline to find a fundamental right in either constitution, then RI legislation 
limiting the practice of physician assisted suicide to mentally competent, terminally ill 
patients who have six months or less to live will be even more likely to be upheld in the 
face of any challenges to it.  
 In sum, I believe that physician assisted suicide legislation, when fashioned with 
adequate safeguards, can be contained to benefit the people who need it most. While 
there is no question that great potential dangers to society exist if this practice is abused, 
it is not impossible to forestall any drastic consequences of physician assisted suicide if 
the law is vigilant and firm. The personal autonomy of the dying patient should extend to 
the choice of the time, manner, and location of death. It is without doubt that the issue of 
physician assisted suicide will soon erupt to onto the national agenda. The question is 
what role will Rhode Island play in this national debate? Will it be a leader or a follower? 
The State of Rhode Island needs to pass a Death with Dignity Act, similar to the laws of 
Washington and Oregon, and assume a leadership role in deciding the inevitably 
contentious question of when life ends.  
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